Introduction
Consider a conventional (single-key) cryptosystem with enciphering function E and deciphering function D. Let S be a set of keys, where the key length is b bits. A master key for S is a key MK such that:
(1) E(MK, P) = E(K, P) for any plaintext P and K in S; (2) D&X, C) = D@, C) for any ciphertext C and K in S; (3) IMKI << ISIb, where IMKI is the length of MK in bits, and I Sl is the number of keys in S.
7"he first two requirements state that messages enciphered (deciphered) with any key in the sei S must be decipherable (enci;pherable) with the master .key MK. The third requirement states that the space requirements for MK must ,be substantially less than that of all keys in S; otherwise, MK could be implemented simply as a list of the keys in S. MK, therefore, provides a compact representation of S. Consider a network of N users. Agroup G is any nonempty subset of the N users. Members of G share a secret group ksy KG, which allows them to broadcast and receive messages from other members of G, and to access and update files private to G. Users not in G are not allowed access to KG* In this scheme, we assume that for each user A, the AS stores A's personal key KA and two secret values, XA and YA. However, unlike the personal key, the secret values are known only to the AS and not to A (the reason for this will be explained later for constructing a key from a set of components [4] . There can be at most 2N -1 nonempty groups in the system. We shall present two methods for deriving group keys and a master key MK for the entire set of 2N -1 group keys such that the space requirements for MK are linear in N. The first method is based on Shamir's threshold scheme, the second,on Diffie and Hellman's public-key distribution scheme. We shall also show how both methods can be used to provide master keys for sets of groups that are hierarchically structured.
We assume that each user A has a personal key KA registered with an Authentication Server (AS) [3] . The AS derives all group keys and transmits them to the users enciphered under their personal keys.
Polynomial derived group keys
users of some group G of size n. Construct the unique polynomial PG of degree n -1 through the n puintr in the 2dimensional plane: (X1, Y i),' . . . . (X,,, Y,,). Tile group key KG is the value of the polynomial at 0; that is,
For a group G consisting of a single user A (i.e. G = {AF), n = 1 and the polynomial PCA) is a constant function independent of the (X, Y)-coonlinates. In this case, we shall assume that P(A)(O) = KA; that is, the group key for a single user is the user's personal key. Arithmetic is done modulo a prime number p, where log* (p) is not greater than the key length b. The Xeoordinates for all users are distinct but randomly drawn from the range [ 1, . . . . p -11. Thus, each group has a different polynomial, and it is not possible for one group to guess either the polynomial or the key for another group. In Shamir's application, it is unnecessary for the X-coordinates to be secret, because the individual users are not given the polynomial derived key. Since in our application the users are given the key, both the X-and Y-coordinates must be secret. Furthermore, the pair &, YA) associated with user A must not be known even to A. If each user had access to his (X, Y)aordinates, it would 'be possible for any n -1 of the members of a group G of size n to reconstruct the polynomial PG (since the key Ko gives then an nth point). Users could then collaborate and determine the secret (X, Y)<oordinates of other users. For example, suppose users A and B wish to determine the secret values (Xc, YC, for user C. If user A requests the key for the group G(,,), he could determine the coefficients a1 and bi of the group polynomial:
P{A,c) = al X + bi .
Similarly, if user B requests the key for the group G{~BIc), he could determine the coefficients a2 and b2 of the group polynomial:
Since (Xc, Yc) is a solution to both P{A,c) and P{B,~ '), A and B ctiuld determine (Xc, Yc) by solving the syztem:
Yc -al Xc = bl , Yc -a2Xo =b2 . 24 Similarly, A and B could determine the values (XD , YD) for a user D, and then listen in on a conversation between C and D! A user A requests a group key KG from AS by supplying a list of the members of the group: A+AS: 'G= {Ul,U2, :..,U,J,.
(
If A belongs to the group (i&e., A = Vi for some i, 16 i <n), AS constructs Ko and returns it to A, enciphered under A's personal key KA:
Exponentially derived group keys
The second method is similar to Diffie and Hellman's publickey distribution scheme [2 1. However, it is not a public-key distribution method, because the AS must have access to users' personal secret keys. L&K 1, . . . . K,, be the personal keys of the members of a group G of size n. The group key is:
where p is a prime number fixed by AS such that log2(p) <b. When a member A of G requests KG from the AS, the AS returns b, cziphered under the personal key K,+ The master key is represented by the list of personal keys.
Another member of G may be able to determine 2KA mod p, but he cannot compute KA without computing a discrete logarithm. Now, if p is only 200 bits long, Ic,, can be computed in about 2.6 days on a 1 fls per instruction machine 111. Wowever, if p is 400 bits long (i.e., b 3 4OQ), KA. carinot be practically computed by the fastest known algorithms.
Application to hierarchical group structures
Considera tree structure in whichnodes correspond to subsystems or processes. Let theroot of the tree correspond to the entire sys&m,snd the descendents of a node to its components. These components might ,coopemte by 8~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~t~~~'by ac+sing .a-**@non 'da$&se %by e#$s&ng messages. Such comrnum~atioir c X4:1 be '&de s&ure%y def&g a group G that includes only these component subsystems, and enciphering all communications and data files using the group key KG. In systems of this type, it is often useful to designate some process MG as the manager of all communication among and within the components of G, Such a process can oversee resource utilization and monitor other aspects of system operation. We desire to permit Mo access to all subgroup keys for subgroups formed from subsets of G, and no others.
Both methods of derived group keys provide attractive methods for providing group managers with master keys. With polynomial derived group keys, each manager & for a group G of size n needs only store a list of the n pairs (Xi, Yi) for each user i in G. With exponentially derived group keys, each manager needs only store a list of n personal keys. Either list represents a master key, from which any of the 2" -1 subgroup keys for G can be generated.
